With the popularity of wireless communication devices a new important dimension of embedded systems design has arisen, that of security. This paper presents for the first time design exploration for secure implementation of cryptographic applications on a complex DSP processor core. A new metric for security, the implementation security index, is introduced for measuring resistance to power attacks. Elliptic curve cryptographic algorithms are used to demonstrate and quantize security, energy, performance and code size tradeoffs. Modification of power traces is performed to maximize security against power attacks which has significant savings in energy dissipation compared to' an existing mathematical approach. This research is important for industry since efficient yet secure cryptography is crucial for wireless communication embedded system devices.
INTRODUCTION
Unlike current design methodologies for embedded systems which concentrate on high performance, low cost, low power and low energy, security is increasingly becoming important. Design for security involves secure protocol implementation and power analysis in addition to algorithm design. In fact power dissipation has a large impact on security as well as cost, and reliability of an embedded system. Not only must cryptographic algorithms be high Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal orclasrwmu~e is granted without fee pravlded that copies are not made or distributed far profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the fall citation on the fint page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on sewen or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ISSS'O2.October24.2002 , Kyoto, Japan.
Copyight 2002 ACM 1-581 13-576-9/02/0010 ... $5.00. performance and low energy, but more importantly they must be secure or safe from side channel attacks. A side channel attack involves obtaining useful information from the cryptographic application which may lead to the revelation of the secret key. Useful information includes the amount of time it takes to perform various operations or the variation of power dissipation during key computations. In the later case this is known as a power attacktl]. The power attack is more difficult and challenging to avoid. As an example, an attacker who has obtained the secret key is able to eavesdrop on a confidential wireless communication between two parties. Consider Alice, the victim, who wishes to encrypt a conversation with Bob. She first has to set up a session key. Alice computes the session key as: xP in elliptic curve cryptography (or y" mod n in RSA technology) where x is the secret key and this computation is performed various times for different P's (or y's). The attacker may know P (or y ) and in addition may obtain the computations times or may be able to monitor power dissipation. With this additional information the attacker may eventually be able to compute the secret key, x [I] .
When the attacker has obtained the secret key, communication between Alice and Bob is not secure. Altematively, obtaining the secret key in other applications, such as smart cards, allows one to illegally use phone or digital TV services. In power attacks, the dynamic power of the device is measured over time (for example a smart card which has been inserted into a fake banking machine or the attacker has temporarily obtained the portable device with the embedded secret key). In elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), the analysis of power may reveal when a point doubling occurs (or calculation of 2P), and when two points are being added (such as 2P+P) in d e computation of xP, thus revealing the secret key. In SOC platforms, core processors often run at different voltages, and use separate power pins, thus secure implementations of cryptography are important to discourage any power attacks. Furthermore these complex chips are often composed of network processors in addition to many DSP cores, thus cryptography on DSP cores is an important lower cost alternative tn encryption cores. This paper for the first time presents a new metric for quantizing security and design exploration for ECC on a DSP processor core. Results are based upon real measured dynamic power. Additionally tradeoffs in code size, performance, and energy dissipation for security are explored.
Previous literature has discussed performance and energy dissipation at lengtb [lO,l2] , however only recently with the widespread use of wireless communications has interest in the security of embedded system designs increased. Typically embedded systems involve the design of low power, low cost, high performance algorithms supporting wireless communication systems with audio and video types of data. However keys used to encrypt various types of data must be secure. For example cryptography provides techniques for authentication (verification that the receiver of your transmitted data is who you want it to he and not an imposter) and for generating sessions keys. Currently research in power attacks of smart cards, have utilized general purpose processors with low clock kequencies [I] . Typically smart card applications are not time critical and energy dissipation is not a major concern since power is attained from the card reader (or ATM machine, etc) [S] . Power attacks of more sophisticated processors with parallel instruction execution have not been reported in the literature. The measurement of power while a processor is executing an application (or a power trace) has been used in power-attacks of cryptographic devices, such as smart cards [l] . In particular the analysis of the variation of power, and computations on a number of power traces can he used to detect data and algorithmic dependencies [l] . This research studied the correlation of power variation with data values being manipulated and instruction sequencing. In the former case, known as differential power attacks(DPA), encryption applications were analyzed [l] . In DPA, including the extension for elliptic curve clyptography[l5], it is assumed that for each power trace the same instruction is executing at the same instance of time. Thus one defense against DPA is to insert random time shifts to decomelate the output power trace. A defense against another power analysis attack, known as simple power attack (SPA), was to introduce random sequencing o f instructions again to reduce correlations. Elliptic curve cryptography is believed to he more complex yet eficient [7, 6] compared to RSA technology and is used in many smart cards and other devices. For example a 1024 bit key in RSA is equivalent to 160 bit key in ECC [5] . Researchers addressing smart card application have suggested security against power attacks he achieved through 70% increase in computational cost. This is achieved through using different forms of the curve, such as the Jacobi form, where mathematically the sum and the double of a point use the same formula [3, 8] . The study of DSP processors in cryptography has been limited, however their resistance to power attacks has not been addressed. Recent low power research work in embedded systems design is directed towards minimizing energy dissipation [9, 10] and power modeling [l1,12] . Researchers have also investigated power traces to obtain exact timing information of applications running on processors [2] . Modifying power traces to save energy dissipation, known as dynamic power management, has heeu investigated by a number of researchers [9, 10] : However modifymg power traces of applications for implementation-security on DSP processor cores has not previously been studied. This paper will present a new metric for security against power attacks, the implementation security index (LSI), and design exploration of performance, energy dissipation, code size in addition to security. It will he demonstrated on a complex VLIW DSP processor core, the Star*cote (SC140), developed by Motorola and Lucent [4] . An elliptic curve cryptographic application is designed to he resistant to power-attacks yet low energy dissipation, high performance, and small code size objectives are supported.
Security from power-attacks is verified with real current measurements of the DSP hardware VLSI core in a chip. The design and implementation of this cryptographic algorithm will be discussed with emphasis on the implementation security index.
METHODOLOGY
This section will introduce the application, elliptic curve cryptography on prime fields and introduce the methodology used to develop a security index for measuring resistance to power attacks. Prime field ECC was chosen over h i n w field ECC since it was more suitable for DSP processor implementation. Prime field cryptography involves a significant number of integer multiplies which can he performed very efficiently on DSP cores, however binary field cryptography relies more heavily on exclusive or operations. Since cryptographic key sizes are much larger than processor word sizes (32 or 40 bit registers in SC14O's datapath) multi-precision algorithms are used to perform the arithmetic. In addition to a chosen key length, there are many different fields, projective coordinates, and types of elliptic curves that can be implemented. For added security portable devices should he able to support numerous curves and fields. However it is important for the designer to he able to choose which sets to implement on an embedded device, to tradeoff performance, code size, energy dissipation, and security against power attacks. The application, point multiplication, will he introduced ik~ this section, followed by. a discussion of implementation methods.
For this research, point multiplication was explored using different design implementations of Jacobi projective coordinates[8] on the standard Weierstrass equation of the curve and the Jacohi form of the elliptic cwe [8, 3] . Point multiplication (or computation of xP where P and xP are both points on the elliptic curve and x is the secret key) is used in session key generation, signature generation, signature verification, etc. In elliptic curve cryptography, there is no multiplication operation, hence the only method for computing XP is hy doubling and adding. In general this is why elliptic curves are so secure since the problem of finding x given P and xP is a very hard problem. The a very low value of implemented security. This is illustrated in the power trace shown at the bottom of figurel, where S is the sum routine and D is the double routine. The power trace at the top performs point multiplication on the same key but is much more secure since one sum visually looks like two doubles. The modification of sum and double routines for security against power attacks was explored by inserting redundant --operations into the double and sum routines so that the order of operations was identical. Additionally the higher level algorithms were designed so that the routines in between the sum and double were also identical (ie. so one could not distinguish sum followed by double or double followed by sum, or double followed by double). Three different implementations were analyzed for the general Jacobi projective coordinates on the standard Weierstrass equation. Additionally the implementation and power traces of the Jacobi Curve (JC) was performed for a comparison of security (since the Jacobi form uses the same routine for both sum and double). Codesize, performance, energy dissipation and power traces were recorded for each implementation. The power traces for four keys were analyzed w i t h various statistical techniques. Finally a metric for quantizing the security of an applications implementation was developed. We call this metric the ISZ for implementation security index.
EXPERIMENTAL SECTION
The power traces for four keys were obtained for the three different design implementations of the Weierstrass curve plus the Jacobi curve (JC). The three different implementations were called 2F, IL, and WR. In 2F the sum routine was split into two routines which were called at the higher level allowing insertion of miscellaneous code inbetween calls to sums or doubles. In IL the code was *er optimized and fully inlined to again improve performance at the expense of codesize. Finally in WR the code was further optimized replacing redundant operations with more secure implementations and detailed assembly modification to ensure exact timing of the sum routines and double routine. AI1 power traces were obtained by executing the cryptographic algorithms on the SC140 at lOOMHz (for illustration purposes), using a pattern generator and high speed oscilloscope to capture the power traces. In the power trace plots the y-axis represents the current variation and the x-axis representsthe time. Matlab was used for signal analysis of the power waveforms.
The sum and double routines from each power trace was .extracted and the variances and the mean plus or minus two times the standard deviation were computed and plotted in figures 2,3 for 2F and JC. The average variances (3.12E-4 for 2F and 1.911E-4 for JC) provide an initial indication of security. However it is difficult to use it to determine which part of the code needs to be modified to increase security.
Note also in these figures that the differences of the sum and double routines shown in the bottom plot of the figures are high where the power traces have the highest slopes.
The ZL code increased code size by 6 times for only a 11% improvement in performance.
The implementation security index was next computed,
where
standard deviations and number of power subtrace samples are ( X , , j T 2 ) , ( s , , s 2 ) , ( n l , n 2 ) .
Here a subtrace sample is a sum followed by a double (or double followed by a sum )
representing group subscript 1 (or group 2). This metric combines the variance and means, and identifies regions of the power trace where the means differ and variances are low. In these cases the ISI is low indicating that this region of the power trace could he used to differentiate a sum from a double. The ISI can be used by the embedded systems designer to identify regions of the power trace (or routine)
, where the means, /= 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The methodology presented in this paper, has shown that ISI can provide important information for cryptographic applications[l4] being implemented by embedded system designers. Previous methods suggested, such as simple power attacks, or differencing can be improved by exploring variances and ISI. This design exploration has been used to develop code which has improved security yet lower energy dissipation and higher performance compared to the Jacobi curve implementation. Unlike previous power analysis, such as DPA, IS1 has been shown to support a complex processor architecture where each clock cycle involves multiple actives busses and the point multiplication algorithm which includes small timing shifts.
. .
. ~ ,. .. overheads than implementations of researched SPAresistant algorithms, such as the Jacobi curve, Jc [3] . The lower energy dissipation will be important for secure implementations in portable devices. Design exploration of verified elliptic curve point multiplication routines running on a complex VLIW DSP processor core is presented.
Unlike previous research, a new metric, the implementation security index, ISI, has been introduced for quantizing security of implementations. Real power traces have been measured, and security from power-attacks verified with real hardware VLSI chip power measurements. This methodology for the design of secure s o h a r e for the SC140 DSP processor can in general be applied to other processors. Results show that W-R code improves energy dissipation, performance, and implementation security index by 1.44 times, 1.44 times, and 1.1 1 times respectively compared to our implementation of previously researcb routines, JC, with a 31% increase in code size. For the fmt time a security metric, ISI, has been introduced and shown to be a significant aid to embedded system designers to ensure that implementations of applications are secure. Unlike previous research on power management and software techniques to reduce energy dissipatinn [9, 10] , this research has examined modification of power and energy dissipation for security. This research provides implementations with lower energy and performance This metric can be used for design exploration of security i n addition to performance, code size and energy dissipation. This research is crucial for supporting a methodology for designing s o l h a r e that is not only optimized for performance, power and cost, bot also for implementation security. For the first time this research introduces a metric for developing secwe implementations targeting DSP processors in wireless embedded systems.
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